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WHAT NEXT IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES?
WALTER Ei. HOFFMIAN'
On July 11, 1958, Congress authorized the Judicial Conference of
the United States to make a continuing study of the Federal Rules of
Practice and Procedure.1 Implementing action was taken by the Ju-
dicial Conference on September 18, 1958. The Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court announced the formation and personnel
of the various committees2 on April 4, 196o. The basic studies, re-
ports and recommendations are conducted by the advisory committees
in their respective categories, following which they are forwarded to
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. In turn,
the latter committee reports to the Judicial Conference. If approved,
the Conference reports to the Supreme Court. The nation's highest
court will then approve, modify or disapprove, and such changes as
may be adopted are transmitted by the Supreme Court to Congress.
Unless Congress acts adversely the rules automatically become law
after ninety days.
The procedure thus followed contemplates interim submission of
rules and a continuing study to keep abreast of inevitable changes in
our social, economic and political lives. To date, various rule changes
have become law since the formation of these committees.3 Perhaps
*Chief Judge, United States District Court for Eastern District of Virginia.
Member, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules; Attorney General's Committee on
Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice; Judicial Conference
Committee on the Administration of the Probation System. B.S. 1928, University of
Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1931, Washington and Lee University.
1P.L. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356, 28 U.S.C. § 331.
2The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure is the parent
body. Functioning under the Standing Committee are Advisory Committees on (a)
Civil Rules, (b) Criminal Rules, (c) Admiralty Rules, (d) General Orders in Bank-
ruptcy, and (e) Appellate Rules.
3Amendments to Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, adopted
by Supreme Court on April 17, ig6i; Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
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because of the fact that modification of existing criminal rules are
matters of considerable public interest involving the rights of society
and individual freedom, the progress of the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules may appear to be moving at less than the anticipated
speed as only one preliminary draft of proposed amendments to certain
rules has been circulated to the bench and bar for consideration and
suggestions as of the commencement of 1964. No proposed change or
addition has yet reached the stage of submission to the Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The cautious approach to changes in the administration of crim-
inal law is entirely justified. While the veto power is vested in the
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court and
finally in the Congress of the United States, mature consideration
of the many problems presented must rest with the advisory commit-
tee, where -the spade work is done. Many hours of argument among
members4 with divergent views precede the drafting of any rule
change or addition. The personnel of the committee embraces de-
fense lawyers, judges, former judges, former prosecutors and law pro-
fessors who have lived with the problems of administration of justice
in the field -of criminal law for many years. One cannot expect unanim-
ity at the initial stages of drafting. The committee is fortunate to have
the valued services of a reporter and associate reporter who are highly
trained in the field of criminal procedure.5 The tremendous volume
of work in compiling information, considering suggestions, research-
ing legal problems, drafting the initial changes, and preparing the
agenda rests upon the reporter.
To forecast the final action of the advisory committee at this
stage would be impossible; to say nothing of the ultimate action of
the bodies through which the suggested changes must travel. The sole
adopted by Supreme Court on January 21, 1963; Amendments to General Orders
in Bankruptcy, enacted by Congress on May 29, 1961, effective July ig, 1961.
'The members of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules are: Honorable
John C. Pickett, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit (chairman);
Joseph A. Ball, attorney, Long Beach, California; George R. Blue, attorney, New
Orleans, Louisiana; Abe Fortas, attorney, Washington, D.C.; Sheldon Glueck, pro-
fessor, Harvard Law School; Walter E. Hoffman, United States District Judge,
Norfolk, Virginia; Thomas D. McBride, attorney, Philadelphia, Penna.; Maynard
Pirsig, professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Frank J. Remington, pro-
fessor, University of Wisconsin Law School; Honorable William F. Smith, United
States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit; and Lawrence E. Walsh, attorney, New
York.
rThe reporter is Edward L. Barrett, Jr., professor, University of California Law
School; the associate reporter is Rex A. Collings, Jr., Professor, University of Cali-
fornia Law School.
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purpose of this review is to highlight the major questions which have
been advanced for consideration. Of necessity, any discussion of minor
modifications pertaining to technical phraseology must be avoided
in the interest of space limitations. Moreover, even as to the issues
exciting greater interest among defense counsel, law enforcement
officers, judges and others, an exhaustive argument is prohibited.
With this in mind, the scope of this article will be limited to the
areas of (1) the arrest, interrogation of the accused, proceedings before
a commissioner, and the indictment or information, (2) pleas, prepara-
tion for trial, discovery processes and venue, and (3) the trial, sentence,
probation and the special proceeding involving search and seizure.
Taking these matters in order we first consider-
THE PRE-ARRAiGNMENT STAGES
While a minor drafting modification of Rule 4 relative to the
issuance of a warrant upon a complaint is recommended, the basic
requirements "of the essential facts constituting an offense" to estab-
lish probable cause remain as heretofore determined. It is Rule 5(a)
dealing with proceedings before the commissioner which has consumed
many hours of argument with numerous alternative drafts in an
effort to bring about a satisfactory solution to the McNabb-Mallory
problem.7 In the field of criminal procedure it is unlikely that any
one judicial pronouncement has been more vigorously debated, severe-
ly criticized, or strenuously defended. Rule 5(a), as everyone knows,
requires an officer making an arrest to take the arrested person "with-
out unnecessary delay" before the nearest available commissioner
or any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States. Immediately, law en-
forcement officials pointedly suggest that literal compliance with this
requirement destroys any effective interrogation of the suspected per-
son, thereby undermining the entire system upon which law enforce-
ment is predicated. Confessions, even though voluntary, taken from
suspected individuals have been consistently rejected as evidence where
there has been a violation of Rule 5(a). Patently, the purposes of the
rule and the underlying considerations by the Supreme Court are two-
fold: to stifle "third degree" methods of obtaining confessions, and to
bring the arrested person before a judicial officer as quickly as pos-
sible so that he may be advised of his constitutional rights and the
eGiordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
7NMcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.s. 449 (1957); see also: Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
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issue of probable cause determined. Thus the conflict between society
and individual rights is apparent, for it cannot be denied that many
a guilty person is granted his freedom by reason of the exclusion of his
voluntary confession-a fact that astounds the average citizen un-
trained in law.
To wrestle with this major problem which is repeatedly before
Congress in the form of bills to permit the receipt of otherwise vol-
untary confessions irrespective of the delay in bringing the accused
before a judicial officer, the committee has considered many alterna-
tives, among them being an attempt to define the word "arrest"; the
fixing of a stated period wherein interrogation will be permitted; a
special rule for the District of Columbia where the issue is acute;"
a definition of "unnecessary delay" or its counterpart "necessary de-
lay"; authorized detention for limited periods during further investi-
gation of other suspected persons such as in conspiracy matters; re-
quiring regular 24-hour availability of commissioners; shifting the
duty of interrogation to a judicial officer after advising the accused of
his rights; returning, the arrested person to police custody for brief
periods of interrogation following his appearance before the com-
missioner; 9 an obligation imposed upon the arresting officer that he
immediately provide a reasonable opportunity to the accused for
the purpose of communicating with relatives, counsel, or friends. For
reasons too numerous to discuss there are valid objections to these
suggested alternatives and to many others advanced by advocates of
varying views.
The principal difficulty lies in striking a balance between proper
and necessary inquiry and interrogation on the one hand, and the pro-
tection of constitutional rights on the other hand. Congress has pa-
tiently awaited the recommendations of the advisory committee, but it
manifestly appears that the problem cannot be resolved by any rea-
8 While the problem is nationwide, the District of Columbia, controlled by
federal law under a metropolitan police force, is in a unique situation. Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, thoroughly trained as they are, seldom run
into difficulties. Other law enforcement agencies do encounter the confession
issue in a number of cases.
9See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. ig6o), cert. denied, 364
US. 863 (196o) where, by a divided court, the procedure adopted by the municipal
court judge in remanding the defendants to the custody of the police and deputy
marshal for three hours to obtain further evidence, confronting the defendants
with the complainant, and for the purpose of having defendants re-enact the offense,
was upheld. Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 36 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1963), where magis-
trate delivered defendant to police for six hours of interrogation and there was
doubt whether defendant was advised that he need not answer any questions.
Conviction reversed.
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sonable modification of Rule 5(a) and the ultimate decision must rest
with the lawmakers in determining what policy to follow. It should be
noted that McNabb was decided prior to the adoption of Rule 5(a)
and the question may not be finally resolved even if Congress enacts
a statute permitting the introduction of a voluntary admission or vol-
untary confession notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 5-
A study of the history following McNabb and Mallory does not
lead to the belief that all voluntary admissions and confessions ob-
tained during the process of inquiry are inadmissible. The admission
of exculpatory statements made immediately following arrest;' 0 in-
criminating admission made while en route to police headquarters or
to a judicial officer;" statements given promptly upon the commence-
ment of interrogation, either upon arriving at headquarters or follow-
ing a period of no inquiry, have consistently been upheld. 2 A state-
ment taken in violation of Rule 5(a) may sometimes be used in cross-
examination or rebuttal of a defendant who elects to testify.' 3 The
word "arrest" of course does not connote the formal statement that
"you are under arrest."' 4 Following this to a logical conclusion, when
a person is suspected of having committed a crime and is deprived of
his "liberty of movement," he is then under "arrest." But inquiry of
a suspected person where the "liberty of movement" has not been un-
duly restricted has not prevented the introduction of a voluntary con-
fession despite an intermittent interrogation over a period of hours.'0
The freedom of movement and spontaneity of the declaration are
potent factors in determining the admissibility of a voluntary confes-
sion obtained during any interrogation of a suspect, but certainly
the Supreme Court has not forbidden law enforcement officers from
2"Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 3o (D.C. Cir. 1957); but see, Starr v.
United States, 264 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1958), holding that introduction of exculpa-
tory statement solely to show sanity violated Mallory principle.
"Perry v. United States, 253 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Mitchell,
3.22 U.S. 65 (1944).
"Mallory v. United States, 259 F.2d 796, 8oi (D.C. Cir. 1958), statement made
during five minutes of questioning following 12 hours of no interrogation while
defendant was recovering from intoxication.
21rate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, (D.C. Cir. 196o), holding that while an
inculpatory statement taken in violation of the Mallory rule remains inadmissible,
if the defendant goes beyond a mere denial of complicity and relates a set of facts
at variance with his inadmissible statement, the prosecution may rebut this testi-
mony without per se introducing the inculpatory statement.
'In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), it was held that the arrest took
place when the federal agents stopped an automobile and restricted the liberty
of movement of the two men who were suspects.
nUnited States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. g6i), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823
(1962).
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investigating crimes and any mandate prohibiting all questioning of
suspects would paralyze the enforcement of our criminal laws. What
the Supreme Court has condemned is the failure to comply with Rule
5(a) and the deprivation of liberty of movement-not the length of the
interrogation unless it touches upon the voluntariness of the state-
ment.16 Congress, in its wisdom, could perhaps strike a happy com-
promise by providing that all admissions or confessions obtained from
any person interrogated by law enforcement officers after any deten-
tion of liberty are presumptively involuntary, thereby imposing upon
the prosecution the duty to overcome such presumption or, as an al-
ternative, provide for "booking" for investigation during the brief pe-
riod after first advising the person of his constitutional rights.
Faced with this dilemma the advisory committee has, up to this
date, made no suggested change in Rule 5(a). What the legislative
branch of our government may see fit to do is another matter.
The remaining portions of Rule 5 deal with the duties of the
commissioner and the nature of the preliminary examinations. In
large metropolitan areas where a grand jury is continuously in ses-
sion, the commissioner functions as a bail official and frequently the
hearing is continued to be immediately followed by a grand jury in-
dictment. Aside from these metropolitan areas the commissioner's
duties are (or should be) of utmost importance. He is the first judicial
officer before whom the accused is brought. Under existing Rule 5(b)
the commissioner is required to advise the defendant "of his right
to retain counsel." The defendant's right to request the "assignment of
counsel" has been limited to proceedings in the district court.17 Rule
44 is a mandate to the district judge imposing the duty of advising the
defendant of his right to counsel, and to assign counsel unless (i) the
defendant elects to proceed without counsel or (2) he is able to obtain
counsel. Should the assignment of counsel now be made at the com-
missioner level to assure justice to the poor as well as the rich?
For many years attorneys have graciously accepted, as a part of
their professional duty, the obligation of defending indigents accused
of crime. The vast majority of state court appointments result in the
allowance of some compensation. However, in the federal courts there
is no provision to reimburse the attorney for his expenses, to say noth-
ing of any compensation. Since 1937 varying proposals have been in-
"Coppola v. United States, 365 U.S. 762 (ig6i), where the interrogation by fed-
eral agents took place while the accused was in state custody.
27In Chicago, and perhaps in one or tvo other places, the commissioner ap-
points counsel for the defendant at the stage of the preliminary examination.
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troduced in Congress to provide a public defender system in federal
criminal cases. For one reason or another there have been objections
preventing passage of any bill by the House and Senate. In April, 1961,
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy appointed the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Crim-
inal Justice, generally referred to as the Allen Committee, bearing the
name of its chairman.'S The net result of this committee's activities
was the Criminal Justice Act of 1963. The late President Kennedy
emphasized the importance of its passage in a message to the Senate
on March 8, 1963.19 Two bills, one from the House and one from the
Senate, passed the respective bodies prior to adjournment of the ist
Session of the 88th Congress. The measures are bi-partisan and have
strong endorsements. Perhaps by the time this review is published
Congress will have acted. While there are differences of opinion as
to the merits of the public defender system (as eliminated from the
House bill) and the optional plan as suggested in the Criminal Jus-
tice Act passed by the Senate, the disagreement is not substantial and
should be resolved.
Whatever may be the final draft of any such legislation, assign-
ment of counsel at the level of preliminary examination is generally
conceded to be necessary. For this reason, as well as for a better ad-
ministration of criminal justice, the advisory committee is recom-
mending (i) a modification of Rule 5 (b) to the end that the com-
missioner will also be required to inform the defendant "of his right
to request the assignment of counsel" and (2) corresponding changes in
Rule 44 to implement the assignment procedure before a commis-
sioner.
There has been some agitation for a modification of Rule 8 so
as to require the compulsory joinder of offenses and to authorize
separate trials on separate counts.2 0 Interlocked with this problem
is the situation involving the same or similar conduct constituting
a violation of more than one criminal statute which has given rise to a
state of confusion in apparent conflicting interpretations.21 The whole
29The chairman, Francis A. Allen, was, at the time of his appointment, a pro-
fessor of law at the University of Chicago Law School. He now occupies the same
position at the University of Michigan Law School.
2lIn President Kennedy's State of the Union Address on January 14, 1963, he
said that "the right to competent counsel must be assured to every man accused
of crime in federal court, regardless of his means."
"nThe problem is demonstrated in Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (196o).
mMilanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1958); Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 586 (1958); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 8 (1955)-
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area of multiple crimes, double jeopardy, concurrent and consecutive
sentences, and consecutive trials is increasingly a live one in federal
criminal jurisdiction but to attempt a rule encompassing all possible
situations would be frought with danger and, in addition, the matter
should probably be resolved legislatively or judicially. Certainly
Congress should be encouraged to examine the overall problem for
the purpose of making it clear when double punishment is intended,
and resolving the issue of how separate offenses are to be tried in those
situations in which double punishment is not intended, or, as an al-
ternative, to specify the punishment to be imposed upon a finding
of guilty.
THE ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES
The multitude of questions presented by the arraignment and
plea under Rules io and ii furnish the most frequent basis for at-
tack in the popular post-conviction remedy available to federal pris-
oners.2 2 In the event of a not guilty plea there are no appreciable
difficulties but whenever a plea of guilty results in a sentence of im-
prisonment, the prisoner is always ready to attack the court procedure
and his own attorney, whether court-appointed or privately employed.
Aided by the "jail-house lawyers" who must enjoy a lucrative practice,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are carefully studied with
the end in view of picking up some technicality which will result in
the sentence being vacated, a new trial ordered, and a likely dismis-
sal of the action due to the death or disappearance of witnesses after
a period of years. Numerous appellate decisions have lent encourage-
ment to these prisoners and, after all, what have they to lose?
Prior to 1946 when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be-
came effective, the matters of arraignment, advising the defendant of
his rights, assigning counsel, and taking the defendant's plea, were sub-
stantially the function of the clerk. While the clerk still performs some
of these duties, the judge can no longer rely upon these pro forma ac-
tivities, especially where the clerk or deputy clerk is inexperienced
or uninformed as to the details and importance of the rules. In most
instances the judge has become a mechanical robot in handling pleas
of guilty. Prior to arraignment he must ascertain whether the de-
fendant desires the services of an attorney. If the answer is in the
affirmative, he then interrogates the defendant as to his financial abil-
ity to engage his own counsel. If the defendant declines the services of
=2.8 U.S.C. § 2255.
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an attorney, the court must inquire into the age and education of the
accused, and may determine that counsel must be appointed in any
event as a plea of guilty taken from any defendant under the age of
majority with only a limited education is, at best, a hazardous under-
taking in light of many appellate court decisions. In a great number
of federal courts the foregoing activities are scheduled on pre-arraign-
ment days whenever the accused is in custody. Indeed, under the pro-
posed changes in Rule 46 a special provision places upon the judges
the responsibility for supervising the detention of defendants (and
witnesses). With the modifications in Rules 5 (b) and 44 relating to the
appointment of counsel at the commissioner level, together wth more
liberality in fixing the place of trial under Rule 18 and suitable pro-
visions for more expeditious proceedings under Rule 20, detention of
persons awaiting trial will be reduced to a minimum, and should es-
sentially be confined to those pleading not guilty who, for obvious
reasons, cannot be considered eligible for bail under Rule 46 or are
otherwise unable to post bond for their release from custody.
Returning to the arraignment, it should be noted that, once again,
it is the court's obligation to see to it that a defendant is handed a
copy of the indictment or information before being called upon to
plead. When represented by counsel it is common practice for the
actual reading of the indictment or information to be waived, but
whenever the defendant is without the services of an attorney it
would again be dangerous to permit such a waiver in light of the pron-
ouncements that such waiver must be an "intelligent one" with full
understanding of what is being waived. The language of Rule 11 giv-
ing rise to more serious consequences is that the court "may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first de-
termining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of
the nature of the charge." Decisions interpreting the foregoing quo-
tation are legion. The "voluntary" plea calls for freedom from force,
threats, promises and persuasions.2 3 what formerly was deemed suf-
ficient when the clerk inquired of a defendant, "Do you understand
the nature of the charge?" is no longer adequate. The words "nature
of the charge" have been held to require advice to the defendant as
to the range of allowable punishment which can be imposed in the
event of the acceptance of the plea.2 4 If the defendant is of a suitable
2'Aiken v. United States, 296 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961); Smith v. United States,
265 F.2d 99 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957)-
2 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Aiken v. United States, 296 F.2d
604 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957); Gannon
v. United States, 208 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1953).
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age for commitment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, he
must be warned of possible confinement for the maximum period of
six years, which may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment if
sentenced as an adult.25 And it is not enough for a court to assume
that the defendant may be placed upon probation as a subsequent re-
vocation of probation may then bring about an attack upon either the
voluntariness of the plea or lack of understanding of the nature of the
charge.
As the Supreme Court has said that the court "must investigate
as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him
demand"26 it is apparent that a non-delegable duty has been cast upon
the court-one that prevents haste and efforts to dispose of guilty pleas
through ministerial acts of the clerk. The advisory committee is,
therefore, recommending a revision of Rule ii requiring the court
to address the defendant personally, even though he is represented
by counsel, and to propound sufficient inquiries to satisfy the court
that the plea is voluntary and that the defendant understands the
nature of the charge. Since existing Rule ir made no such requirement
in accepting a plea of nolo contendere, the same requirement will be
imposed for this plea prior to its acceptance.
A further suggested modification of Rule ii will place an added
responsibility upon the court to inquire into the factual basis of the
charge in situations involving a plea of guilty (but not nolo conten-
dere). If, upon inquiry, the court determines that the defendant did
not in fact commit the crime charged, there is a provision for setting
aside the guilty plea and entering a plea of not guilty.
Diverse practices exist throughout the United States in handling
guilty pleas. True, the submission of the plea of guilty carries with it
the legal significance that the defendant's conduct falls within the
charge. Some federal courts hear no evidence or summarization of what
transpired. Others permit the United States Attorney to read excerpts
from his file, or listen to the testimony of a government agent, all fol-
lowing the acceptance of the guilty plea. In rare instances, but too
numerous for comfort, an inquiry develops that the defendant has
committed no federal crime. With the "bootlegger" caught at the still,
it is not unusual for this defendant to say, "I pleads guilty to being
near the still," which, standing alone, is no crime. The advisory
committee feels that a more uniform practice of making a brief in-
2Pilkington v. United States, 35 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963). Cf. Cunningham v.
United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5 th Cir. 1958).
"Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (1948).
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quiry into the factual basis of the charge will tend to prevent post-
conviction attacks upon sentences which, in past years, either have
been successful or have required extensive hearings. The inquiry re-
quired is not to be restricted by rules of evidence and probably re-
quires no more information than is already in the presentence report
or the file of the attorney for the government. Whether the suggested
change, inquiring into the factual basis of the charge, is adopted or
rejected, it is likely that many federal courts will continue this al-
ready existing practice.
DIscovERY
With the advent of liberal discovery processes in civil and ad-
miralty cases, it is only natural that there are many advocates of like
procedures in criminal matters. In an address before the Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit on May 9, 1963, Mr.
Justice Brennan traced the history of discovery in criminal cases pre-
vailing in England, France and the Soviet Union. He pointed to the
liberal discovery permitted in the Nuremberg trials, and the ruling of
Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr when de-
fense counsel was granted pre-trial inspection of a letter addressed
to the President of the United States which was in the possession of
the United States Attorney. Mr. Justice Brennan,27 an advocate of
discovery in criminal proceedings, suggests that there are four prin-
cipal arguments against liberal discovery in criminal cases, they being
briefly stated as follows:
(i) Discovery will not lead to honest fact-finding but, on the con-
trary, to perjury and the suppression of evidence.
(2) Advance information as to the names of prosecution witnesses
will result in attempted bribes, efforts to frighten witnesses or, of more
serious consequences, the removal of material witnesses either through
acts of violence or by creating a natural reluctance on the part of the
witness to come forward with information during the investigation
of a crime.
(3) The natural disadvantage to the prosecution in permitting
discovery as a "one-way street" because of the defendant's constitution-
al protection against self-incrimination.
(4) The favorable English experience with broad discovery af-
fords no guide for the United States because of the great disparity in
crime statistics of the two nations and, in light of the increasing rate of
2 Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56 (1963).
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crimes of violence in our nation, the safeguards which now protect
the criminal defendant should not be expanded.
Cogent though these objections may be, they are not entirely meri-
torious. It is not true that the danger of perjured testimony exists in all
cases, civil, admiralty, bankruptcy and criminal? The argument that
the witnesses may be silenced if their names are disclosed prior to trial
is, of course, a substantial one as there are many instances where this
has occurred. But if this practice has existed without the aid of broad
discovery, does it necessarily follow that it will increase merely because
names may be ordered disclosed prior to trial? Certainly the hardened
criminal is generally aware of the witnesses who will be used against
him. Moreover, even the most ardent advocates of liberal discovery
are agreed that judicial discretion should be exercised as a safeguard
in particular cases. The right of a defendant to discover the names of
government witnesses would never be without an equivalent right
of judicial discretion. With respect to the argument that liberal dis-
covery is a "one-way street" we have, of course, a troublesome consti-
tutional question. Does the privilege against self-incrimination repre-
sent a barrier to the prosecution's discovery of the accused? For exam-
ple, California, Ohio and New York have rejected constitutional ob-
jections ,to notice of alibi statutes. 2s Notice of alibi statutes or rules
exist in fourteen jurisdictions. While we cannot predict what the
United States Supreme Court may say in the event of a "two-way street"
discovery rule, we do know that Mr. Justice Brennan, a known sup-
porter of individual constitutional rights, made these comments in
his address noted above:
"Beneficial results are claimed for statutes which require
an accused to give the prosecution pretrial notice of an alibi or
insanity defense. Among them is that they not only prevent
surprise at the trial but that they also aid more effective prepara-
tion by the prosecution for trial, and indeed they do. But what
justifies our being so sure then that according criminal discovery
to the accused will benefit only the accused at the expense of the
prosecution?"
29
With the foregoing in mind, the advisory committee has consid-
ered-and is now studying-the possibilities of "two-way street" dis-
covery. Admittedly there are complications with respect to particular
type cases such as conspiracy and the like. A new rule providing for
29Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Gal. 2d 56, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919
(1962); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931); People v. Schade, 161
Misc. 212, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612 (Queens County Ct. 1936).
-Brennan, supra note 27, at 58.
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a notice of alibi has been circulated to the bench and bar. Whenever
the prosecution suspects that the defendant intends to rely upon the
defense of alibi, the attorney for the government may demand that
the defendant serve a notice of alibi, the demand stating the time
and place the prosecution proposes to establish where the defendant
participated in or committed the crime. If the defendant fails to
serve his notice of alibi, he is then precluded from introducing evi-
dence at the trial (other than his own testimony) tending to show
the defense of alibi. Such a rule may well have a salutary effect for the
defendant as well as the prosecution. If the alibi is determined to be
valid by appropriate investigation prior to trial, it will probably re-
sult in the dismissal of the action without trial. If it turns out to be
false, then the government should be permitted to show the falsity
of the witness who is willing to perjure himself.
With equal force it may be well to initiate proceedings requiring a
notice of insanity, mental incompetency, or mental disease. The
wealthy defendant is able to secure the services of psychiatrists, with-
out knowledge of the prosecution and, on the day of trial, the gov-
ernment is met with the defense of incompetency. Since our federal
system requires proof of mental competency beyond a reasonable
doubt, a rule of this nature would at least make available to the prose-
cution the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist under Rule 28
or, in the alternative, a procedure for study in a qualified hospital in
advance of trial. Once again, such a rule would promote the interests
of the defendant in many instances, and may result in a dismissal of
cases where the mental competency is doubtful.
The committee has suggested that depositions may be taken at the
instance of the government of a witness under certain conditions,
providing for the presence of the defendant at said deposition; the
expense of travel and subsistence of the defendant and his attorney
would be paid by the government. As Rule 15 now reads, the right to
take a deposition in a criminal case rests solely with a defendant. Ap-
proximately twenty-two jurisdictions now provide for depositions to be
taken by the prosecution under varying conditions. The constitu-
tionality of such a provision, while not free from doubt, has been up-
held.30
The right of a defendant to inspect, copy or photograph designated
books, papers, documents or tangible objects has been heretofore lim-
ited under Rule 16 to those matters obtained from or belonging to the
defendant, or obtained from others by seizure or by process. In actual
=ZSee 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1398 n4.
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practice we know that the federal courts and the attorneys for the
government have liberalized this rule. Depending upon the standing
and reputation of defense counsel, it is not uncommon for a United
States Attorney to reveal the contents of his entire file to the attorney
for the defendant. The reason is obvious for, if the government has
an "air-tight" case, the result will probably be a guilty plea.
Suggested Rule 16 specifically provides that there is no right to in-
spect statements or reports made by government witnesses or prospec-
tive government witnesses to agents of the government, except as pro-
vided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500, generally referred to as the Jencks Act. Con-
gress has legislated on this subject and the committee has no desire to
dictate a policy contrary to our legislative body.
The committee feels-and the Department of Justice concurs-that
Rule 16 should be broadened to permit the inspection of any written
or recorded statement or confession made by the defendant to an agent
of the government. Such a practice is essentially in line with the more
modem thinking of the courts. Also recommended is the right to in-
spect the results or reports of any physical or mental examination
and any scientific tests or experiments which may be produced by the
prosecution at the trial for proving the indictment or information, if
within the custody or control of the government. There is every likeli-
hood that Rule 16 will be substantially broadened as heretofore indi-
cated.
There will, in all probability, be safeguards by way of protective
orders in granting or denying discovery motions, As the Department
of Justice points out, a victim's bloodstained shirt may bear the
bloodstains of two different aggressors, one being the defendant and
the other still a fugitive. Disclosure of the report of the blood test
may jeopardize the chances of apprehending and prosecuting the
fugitive. In internal security cases it may be necessary to excise por-
tions of the defendant's confession having no bearing on the crime
but containing information vital to national security. The district
courts should have discretion to deal with these peculiar problems.
Sharp disagreement is expected on the matter of disclosure of
names of witnesses. Certainly the defendant could not constitutional-
ly be required to divulge the names and addresses of his witnesses in
advance of trial. The constitutionality of such a rule may possibly
be upheld under a proviso that if the defendant desires to avail him-
self of any rule requiring the disclosure of prosecution witnesses, then,
as a condition to such disclosure, the court may require the defendant
to name his witnesses. The Justice Department vigorously argues
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against disclosure because of the potential of severe anti-social con-
sequences which are destructive of the integrity of the judicial system.
Threats, intimidation, physical brutality, organized criminal activity,
danger to informants, all point to the cogency of the observation of
Mr. Justice Clark who said, "Dead men tell no tales."3' The Depart-
ment of Justice argues that the manpower and cost of maintaining pro-
tective custody of an informant would be prohibitive and, of even
greater importance, the informant's usefulness to the government
would be terminated when his name is revealed. These informants
work in particular areas for brief periods and are then transferred
to other locations. If a defendant pleads guilty, there is no need to
disclose the informant's name and his usefulness will at least con-
tinue until he is required to appear and testify. Witness intimida-
tion in civil rights cases under 18 U.S.C. § 242, economic pressure
in securities fraud prosecutions, the Landrum-Griffin Act, and crim-
inal anti-trust prosecutions-all generally requiring long periods of
time awaiting trial-pointedly suggest that, even armed with the safe-
guard of a protective order, the requirement of disclosure of names
of witnesses is too great a risk and the benefits to be derived there-
from are too slight. The main difficulty with a protective order is that,
when the court is called upon to act, there is little probability that
such dangers are apparent. On balance, the objections of the Depart-
ment of Justice seem to be meritorious. Whether the committee will
recommend any such disclosure remains to be seen.
At the preliminary stages of consideration by the committee there
was some discussion relating to a proposal permitting discovery
depositions of prospective witnesses similar to the practice now pre-
vailing in civil and admiralty cases. This was first advanced as a "one-
way street" available only to the defendant; thereafter it was explored
as a "two-way street" making the defendant and his witnesses amen-
able to discovery, if the defendant elected to resort to discovery of
any prosecution witness; the theory being that the defendant would
thereby waive his privilege of self-incrimination. Such a procedure
raises serious constitutional questions as it is well settled that a waiver
of the privilege must occur in the same proceeding in which it is
sought to be invoked.32 Whether a discovery deposition in a pending
criminal matter would be considered as a "same proceeding" in the
aiRoviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 66-67 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
"Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952); Poretto v. United
States, i96 F.2d 392 (5 th Cir. 1952); In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1953);
Cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896).
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event a defendant made damaging admissions and the prosecution en-
deavored to introduce such admissions at the trial would, at least, be
debatable. But of even greater importance would be the prolongation
of criminal trials for indefinite periods, the magnitude of the expense
involved, the obvious abuses which would creep into such a system,
the necessity for disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses, and
the difficulty of properly administering such a procedure in the event
the witness fails to disclose certain facts to which he thereafter tes-
tifies. It is not reasonably foreseeable that any discovery depositions
will be permitted in criminal cases.
PRE-TRIAL AND THE TiME AND PLACE OF TRIAL
The existing rules make no provision for pre-trial conferences.
Such conferences are now being utilized in many federal courts even
in the absence of an appropriate rule. Much can be accomplished by the
court and counsel in shortening the trial and narrowing the issues,
especially in protracted cases. No sensible jurist would enter upon
the trial of a criminal anti-trust case without the benefit of one or
more extensive pre-trial conferences. Undoubtedly the committee will
attempt to formulate a simple rule to establish a legal basis for what
is now being done.
The time and place of trial and related proceedings as now stated in
Rules 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 is the subject of proposed amendments.
Many states have statutory divisions set forth in particular districts.
Other divisions are provided for by local rules. Where there are num-
erous divisions, some of which are widely scattered, there have been
unnecessary delays in bringing a defendant to trial or, even more ex-
treme, delays in appointing counsel and advising a defendant of his
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has held that there is no
constitutional right to trial within a division where the offense was
committed.33 It is proposed that Rule 18 be amended to eliminate
the requirement that the prosecution be in a division in which the
offense was committed, and that the trial and related proceedings
be at a place within the district as may be fixed by the court with due
regard to the convenience of the defendant and his witnesses. The
language of present Rule 19 permitting proceedings in another divis-
ion "if the defendant consents" would likewise be stricken. This will
enable judges visiting certain divisions at brief and infrequent inter-
United States v. Anderson, 32 8 U.S. 699 (1946); Barrett v. United States, 169
U.S. 218 (1898).
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vals to cause a defendant (particularly one in custody) to be brought
before the court in another division, at which time the defendant may
be advised of his rights, counsel may be appointed, the time and
place of trial may be fixed, questions relating to release on bail may
be discussed and, in general, the entire administration of criminal
justice may be expedited. While there are some objections to this
procedure by defense counsel in the larger states, it is believed that
the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.
The revision of Rule 18 eliminating division venue requires cor-
responding changes in Rule 2 1. Appropriate contemplated amend-
ments to Rule 21 will now permit a transfer to another district
upon motion of defendant for prejudice, the district selected to be
within the discretion of the court. A further change is suggested in
Rule 21(b) to meet the situation arising where one of several offenses
charged was committed in more than one district, thereby permit-
ting on motion of defendant (i) a severance of a particular offense with
a transfer, (2) a transfer of all or part of the offenses charged, or (3)
a refusal to transfer any of the offenses.3
4
Existing Rule 2o has been very beneficial in the administration
of criminal law and procedure. It contemplates that whenever a de-
fendant wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, he may waive trial
in the district in which the indictment or information is pending and
consent to the disposition of the case in another district. The pro-
cedure is particularly helpful in cases involving fugitives or crimes such
as interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. The defendant is
frequently arrested in states far removed from the place of crime. The
delays and expense of transfer are avoided where the defendant in-
tends to plead guilty. Despite the effectiveness of Rule 20, it still
causes unnecessary delays where a defendant is arrested prior to the
return of an indictment or the filing of an information. Moreover,
there is no provision for handling juveniles arrested in a district
other than that in which he is alleged to have committed the crime.
As revised, Rule 20 will resolve the situations in which (1) an indict-
ment or information is pending, (2) an indictment or information is
not pending, and (3) invoking a juvenile delinquency proceeding in
the district in which the juvenile is arrested or held; all of the fore-
going being under the assumption that the defendant wishes to plead
guilty or nolo contendere. These changes will greatly assist in term-
"The problems are demonstrated in United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724
(5 th Cir. 196o).
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inating matters which must now await indictment or information
in distant states.
THE TRIAL AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDNGS
A trial balloon was presented to the bench and bar in an effort to
reduce the number of peremptory challenges now available in the
selection of petit jurors.35 The committee felt that in the average
criminal case the number of challenges brought about a waste of jury
effort with the attendant expense and loss of individual time on
the part of the jurors. Almost without exception the bar opposed
the reduction in the number of challenges. If any change is to be
made in the number of challenges, Congress will have to act. The leg-
islative branch of our government has, of course, specified the num-
ber of challenges in capital cases. An acceptable recommendation is
to be found with respect to the number of alternate jurors and the
committee, by reason of experience in protracted criminal cases, has
suggested increasing the permissible number from four to six and, in
addition, has provided for an alternate juror to be seated when a
regular juror becomes or is "found to be unable or disqualified" to
perform his duties, thereby taking care of the situation where it is first
discovered during the trial that a juror was unable or disqualified at
the time he was sworn. The right to substitute an alternate juror after
the jury has retired to deliberate, or otherwise permit alternate jur-
ors to participate in deliberations or listen to same, raises serious
constitutional objections and past experience does not indicate that
advocating such a modification is worth the risk.
Rule 25 authorizes another judge to act after verdict or finding of
guilt in the event of the trial judge's absence from the district, death,
sickness or other disability. Since the present wording limits the power
of substitution to proceedings after verdict or a finding of guilt, there
should be some authority to provide for the services of a substitute
judge prior to the above specified times in the event of death or pro-
longed illness of the presiding jurist. Especially is this true in jury cases
where the jury is the final arbiter of the credibility of witnesses. In
the celebrated German-American Bund case, a mistrial was declared
after testimony had been taken for seven and one-half months when
the trial judge died in 1944. In the Second Circuit long criminal jury
3Rule 24 now provides for 6 peremptory challenges on the part of the govern-
ment and io such challenges for the defendant or defendants jointly. The suggested
change cut this number in half, but provided that the court could allow additional
challenges to the extent stated in the existing rule.
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trials are not uncommon.36 Since Rule 25 now provides discretion
for granting a new trial, it would seem that, despite some doubts as
to constitutionality, a change should be made to take care of this
unusual situation in jury trials.
Since questions of evidence are now before another committee3 7
considering the possible adoption of uniform rules of evidence for
the federal courts, it is unlikely that any modification of existing
Rule 26 may be expected pending a comprehensive study of the report
from this committee. Undeniably this will be a controversial issue
when it arises.
Minor changes as to motions for judgment of acquittal, objections
to jury instructions, motions for a new trial and in arrest of judg-
ment, and correcting a sentence imposed in an illegal manner (as
distinguished from correcting an illegal sentence) 38 are technical in
nature and, while suggested changes raise some problems in drafts-
manship, the spirit of the proposed amendments is not essentially
undermined.
A major dispute has arisen on the disclosure of the contents of pre-
sentence reports under Rule 32(c)(2). Trial judges are, almost with-
out exception, opposed to any requirement of disclosure. Defense at-
torneys favor disclosure-some even to the extent of revealing sources
of confidential information. State courts have adopted varied practices.
Many federal judges comment upon portions of the report prior to
pronouncing sentence and, in the discretion of the court, copies of
the report have been made available to the defendant or his counsel.
The Supreme Court has affirmatively held that it is not a denial of
due process of law for a court, in imposing sentence, to rely on a report
of a presentence investigation without disclosing such report to the
defendant or giving him an opportunity to rebut it.39 There are valid
arguments pro and con, the review of which would be the subject
of a separate article. In weighing the merits, while federal judges
should be encouraged to give a summarization of the report without
revealing, directly or indirectly, confidential sources of information,
any mandatory disclosure may tend to destroy the probation system. 40
The United Dye securities fraud trial ended on February 4, 1963, after eleven
months and five days. Many other cases could be cited as examples for the necessity
of substituting a trial judge under emergency conditions, as well as the need for
increasing the number of alternate jurors.
5Trhe Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
'-ill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
°Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949).
"'The recently formulated Judicial Conference Committee on the Administra-
tion of the Probation System voted unanimously against compulsory disclosure.
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Of course, if Congress should see fit to grant appellate review of sen-
tences-a matter strongly advocated by many-disclosure would be in-
evitable.
While it is unlikely that any district judge would revoke a de-
fendant's probation except after a hearing at which the defendant
is present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is pro-
posed, a provision is suggested for the appropriate modification of
Rule 32 requiring this action. Not specifically stated is the question
of the right to counsel at a revocation hearing but in the light of
existing Rule 44 providing for the right to counsel "at every stage
of the proceeding" it is certainly the better part of wisdom for a
district judge to appoint counsel unless the probationer elects to pro-
ceed without counsel or is able to obtain his own attorney.
Drastic modifications of the bail provisions under Rule 46 have
met with almost universal acceptance. The policy is, and should be,
against unnecessary detention awaiting trial. In summary, the modifica-
tions will permit the release of defendants under conditions which
are substantially equivalent to the bail bond premium now being paid,
but this amount so deposited will be returned to the defendant or
depositor upon the defendant's appearance. The bail-jumping statute,
IS U.S.C. § 3146, has made possible a modern approach to unneces-
sary detention, and the new rule directs that the defendant's atten-
tion be called to the penalties imposed by this statute in the event of
wilful failure to appear. It is believed that this opportunity for free-
dom pending trial will result in sound economics and the end result
will be that only those who deserve to remain in jail will be without
remedy. With the requirement of continuing supervision over the de-
tention of defendants pending trial, there is no sound reason to believe
that courts should be unduly criticized in future years on the sub-
ject of unnecessary detention.
This review has not attempted to touch upon literally hundreds
of related matters. For example: (I) Should Rule 41 (search and sei-
zure) be enlarged to permit pre-trial motions to suppress confessions?
(2) Should the minutes of a grand jury be revealed on pre-trial motion
of a defendant or, as presently provided, where "particularized need"
exists? 41 (3) Should it be compulsory to have a court reporter, stenog-
rapher, or a mechanical recording device at all sessions of a grand
jury and, if so, should it be mandatory that these proceedings be
"'Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States
v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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transcribed?4 2 (5) Should the government be permitted to appeal
from an adverse ruling suppressing evidence under Rule 41, and
should a defendant be accorded the privilege of an interlocutory
appeal where suppression is denied? These and many other problems
arise, some of which are major and others minor. They cannot be
resolved overnight and Congress has prudently provided for a con-
tinuing study of the rules.
Just as the problems are unending, so also the conflicts will persist
with one group advocating the rights of the individual and the other
defending the rights of society in an effort to combat crime. The solu-
tion is not readily available. As Dr. Samuel Johnson said approxi-
mately 200 years ago, "The danger of unbounded liberty and the dan-
ger of bounding it have produced a problem in the science of gov-
ernment which human understanding seems hitherto unable to solve."
The words could well have been uttered on January 1, 1964.
'By way of dictum, United States v. Giampa, 29o F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. x961),
states that such a transcript must be available at the trial, but no precedent is cited
which requires a transcript in every case.
1964]
